The Tripoli Agreement Was a Separatist Agreement

Under the government of Fidel V. Ramos, the government and the MNLF signed the final peace agreement in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1996. [11] It allowed qualified MNLF members to join the ranks of the Philippine Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police, and established the Council for Peace and Development of the Southern Philippines, which was dominated by the MNLF. Misuari then ran unopposed for governor of the ARMM. [12] The peace agreement earned Ramos and Misuari the Félix Houphouët Boigny Peace Prize in 1997. [13] The second particular problem is that the 1996 peace agreement did not bring peace to Muslim Mindanao. As in the 1989 negotiations, the Philippine government decided to negotiate only with the main Muslim separatist faction – the MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, a signatory to the original Tripoli agreement. In the years following the 1996 agreement, two other armed separatist factions – the Islamic Muslim Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf (Sword of the Father) – clashed militarily with the Philippine army, and these clashes have escalated enormously recently. Although the Philippine government tends to consider these two factions to be interchangeable, they are actually very different geographically and politically.

The Abu Sayyaf faction is of relatively recent origin, only appeared in 1993 and focuses on the island of Basilan. This is a small, loosely organized and rather mysterious group that has enjoyed limited popular support (although recent events may have increased this support somewhat). . The MILF dates back to 1984 as an independent organization, but its roots go back to the beginnings of modern Muslim separatism (McKenna 1998). It focuses on the big island of Mindanao, is well organized and has thousands of fighters and broad support in rural villages. While the Abu Sayyaf faction has made more and more headlines with its killings and abductions, the MILF (which has condemned Abu Sayyaf`s activities) is the only rebel group with sufficient military power and civilian support to wage a prolonged war against the government again. After some initial armed clashes with government forces shortly after the signing of the 1996 agreement, the MILF signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1997 and began peace talks. Negotiations were slow and interrupted by occasional skirmishes. Since late 1999, however, fighting has intensified, and in early 2000 the MILF withdrew from peace talks.

At the moment (September 2000), fighting between the MILF and government forces is intensifying and becoming more widespread than ever since the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. The Philippine government is therefore caught between its desire to end a costly armed separatist challenge that has proven insensitive to military repression and the considerable pressure exerted on it by various interest groups, especially Christians in Mindanao, not to make substantial concessions to Muslim separatists. This has led to the creation of a number of formally autonomous entities, which are extremely limited in both their power and scope. It has also led the Philippine government to ignore as much as possible the Muslim separatist front based in central Mindanao, which is most likely to operate with concentrations of the Christian population. Since 1987, the MILF has carried out offensive actions only to force the government to the negotiating table with a demonstration of its armed capabilities. In 1987, it turned into offensive armed action after a peaceful mass protest in the town of Cotabato provoked absolutely no reaction from the government (McKenna 1998). It is also likely that the MILF changed its stated objectives from its initial demand for autonomy to a request from a separate state, mainly to attract the attention of the government. The agreement provides for the formation of a new, larger autonomous region in Mindanao, named Bangsamoro after the Muslims who live there. The second phase of the 1996 peace agreement, originally scheduled for September 1999, provided for the creation of a new regional self-government with its own executive council, legislative assembly and representation in the national government. It would also have tax collection powers, a regional security force, an education system that would include Madaris (Islamic schools) and a system of Sharia courts (Muslim 1999). The limits of this new regional self-government should be determined by referendum. However, the agreement allowed for the redrawing of provincial boundaries “to regroup predominantly Muslim communities,” making it likely that the new regional autonomous government would be much larger than the current ARMM and would include most of Mindanao`s Muslim communities (Gutierrez 1999).

The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 was signed on 23 September 1976. It was signed by Carmelo Z in Tripoli, Libya, in 1976. Barbero, who represents the government of the Philippines, and Nur Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front. [1] The agreement defined autonomous administrative units for Muslims in the southern Philippines, the establishment of an autonomous government, a judicial system for Sharia law and special security forces, and the observance of a ceasefire. [2] The autonomous region should have its own economic system, including an Islamic bank. [3] Peace negotiations took place between 1993 and 1996 and resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement that managed to adhere closely to the Tripoli Agreement signed 20 years earlier and remain within the formal limits of the 1987 Constitution and the Congressional Act establishing the Muslim Autonomous Region of Mindanao. The 1996 agreement provided for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in two phases. First, it created a transitional administrative structure known as the Council for Peace and Development of the Southern Philippines (SPCPD).

This body replaced the provisional government provided for in the Tripoli Agreement, but was not authorized by the 1987 constitution (Ferrer 1997). The role of the SPCPD was to monitor the implementation of the agreement during a three-year trial phase. Most importantly, the SPCPD covered the 14 provinces and nine cities provided for in the Tripoli agreement. Only Misuari, founder and president of the MNLF, was appointed president of the SPCPD and won the election to the position of governor of the ARMM. The agreement also provided for the integration of thousands of MNLF combatants into the Philippine Armed Forces and the National Police. The development component of the Council for Peace and Development of the Southern Philippines was seen as the key to the agreement. During the three-year trial period, the SPCPD was tasked with demonstrating the economic benefits of peace in an autonomous region to Muslim supporters and distrustful Christian residents by channeling domestic and international development funds into the region and attracting foreign investment. But the important peace agreement with the MNLF was signed in 1996 with President Fidel Ramos. This paved the way for Misuari`s candidacy, and he was elected governor of the ARMM the same year. In 2008, the government of President Gloria Arroyo said it had reached an agreement with the MILF on the borders of a Muslim homeland. On 7 October, he announced that the government had reached a peace framework agreement with the MILF following talks in Malaysia. In the same year, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which had split from the MNLF in 1977, began informal talks with the Ramos-led government.

However, these were not prosecuted and the MILF began recruiting and setting up camps and became the dominant Muslim rebel group. The government of Joseph Estrada took a firm stance against the; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo attempted to sign a peace agreement with her, but was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. [12] However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the draft agreement was unconstitutional and that the failure of the negotiations had led to renewed fighting. The 1992 national elections brought a new president to power. As a former military officer, President Fidel Ramos was aware of the potential costs of a prolonged state of war with the MNLF, which still received significant diplomatic support from the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. He also had much tighter control over the Philippine military than his predecessor and was therefore better able to encourage the MNLF even against the will of some military officers. .